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1 Introduction
Over the last fifteen years, many European countries have believed a profound reform of their state pen-
sion system to be necessary (Bo¨rsch-Supan (2012)). Strong demographic pressure, an acute economic
crisis, and internal imbalances have affected the sustainability of state pension systems. Among the
measures taken, we would highlight the parametric changes in the system, i.e., those changes that affect
one or several variables without affecting their structure. Examples are raising the retirement age or
increasing the number of years in employment used to compute the base pension. Also, in some cases
the reforms have involved the incorporation of a sustainability factor so as to automatically modify
certain aspects of the pension system.
The sustainability factors fall within the category of so-called “automatic balancing mechanisms”. The
underlying idea is to link one or more parameters of the system with the evolution of an exogenous
variable. This may be life expectancy, the variation of the ratio of pensioners to contributors, or GDP
growth (see Vidal-Melia´ et al. (2009) or Sakamoto (2008)). For example, in Denmark retirement age
is linked to life expectancy, whereas in Portugal and Finland it is the base pension which is affected
by variations in this same variable. In Germany, however, the revaluation of the pensions is affected
by the variation of the ratio between pensioners and contributors (Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2003)). The
case of Sweden is more complex as the automatic balancing mechanism is based on the result of the
actuarial balance of the system (Settergren (2001)). In this way, the mechanism restores balance to the
system without legislative intervention.
In the Spanish case, with the progressive aging of the population, the problems that the state pension
system is facing are no different from those affecting most European countries. According to the
demographic projections included in “The 2012 Ageing Report” (European Comission (2012)), it is
estimated that the 7.2 million pensioners in 2015 will become 14.7 million in 2050. Also, the long-term
demographic projections of the National Statistics Institute 2012-2052 estimate that life expectancy at
the age of 65 is increasing by about sixteen months every ten years. Thus the projections indicate that
the system will have to provide pensions to more beneficiaries for longer time. On the other hand, birth
rates are decreasing. The rate of growth of revenue from contributions is therefore slowing. According
to the same European Commission’s projections, the ratio of contributors to pensioners will fall from
2.32 in 2015 to 1.28 in 2050. For these reasons, in recent years several studies have highlighted the
need to implement reforms in the system (see for example Conde-Ruiz and Alonso (2004), Jimeno et al.
(2008), Dı´az-Gime´nez and Dı´az-Saavedra (2009), Sa´nchez-Mart´ın (2010)).
The biggest reform in the Social Security system since the restoration of democracy was with Law
27/2011 of 1 August. This addressed the updating and modernization of the Social Security system.
It was passed after the approval of the Recommendation Report of the Parliamentary Commission
on the Toledo Pact, and based on the social and economic agreement for growth, employment, and
guarantee of pensions signed by the Government and employer (CEOE, CEPYME) and worker (CCOO,
UGT) organizations on 2 February 2011. The reform gradually establishes (from 2013, with transition
periods to 2027) significant parametric changes. These include raising the retirement age from 65 to
67 (except in long-period contribution retirements which remain at 65), increasing by two years the
number of qualifying years to be eligible for a full pension (37 from the previous 35), and increasing
from 15 to 25 the number of years computed for the calculation of the base pension. As a novelty, it
establishes the implementation of a sustainability factor. According to Article 8, in order to maintain
the proportionality between the contributions to the system and the expected benefits of the system,
as well as to guarantee its sustainability, it is agreed that from 2027 the fundamental parameters of the
system will be reviewed. This review will respond to the differences in the evolution of life expectancy at
the age of 67 in the year the review is carried out and the life expectancy at the age of 67 in 2027. This
reform is consistent with the recommendations of the “White Paper: An Agenda for Adequate, Safe,
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and Sustainable Pensions” of 2012, and with other reports framed within the 2020 European Strategy
for the coordination of the economic policies of the members of the European Union. According to the
2011-2014 Stability Programme, these legislative modifications would mean a saving suppose for the
system equivalent to 1.4% of GDP in 2030, 2.8% in 2040, and 3.5% in 2050.
Although Law 27/2011 established the implementation of the sustainability factor in 2027, the severe
economic tensions that followed added pressure for an earlier implantation. The major pension surplus
became a deficit. It became necessary to use two reserve funds, the Social Security Reserve Fund
and the Prevention and Rehabilitation Fund of the Mutual Insurance Societies of Work Accidents
and Occupational Diseases, to cover pension expenditure. The fall in employment, and therefore in
contributions, showed the need for additional measures to ensure the financial stability and soundness
of the system. Thus, the law Ley Orga´nica 2/2012 of 27 April of budgetary stability and financial
sustainability establishes in its Article 18 that, in the case of anticipating a long term deficit in the state
pension system, the Government will review the system, implementing automatically the sustainability
factor in the terms and conditions provided in the Law 27/2011. This is intended to balance future
expenditures with the contributions following the deterioration of the proportion between contributors
and pensioners. As noted by Ferreras (2013), these modifications were consistent with the position
expressed by the European Council when, in the 10 July 2012 session, it recommended “to ensure that
retirement age is rising in line with the life expectancy when regulating the sustainability factor foreseen
in the recent pension reform”.
The law Real Decreto-Ley 5/2013 of 15 March, dealing with measures to favour the continuity of the
working life of older workers and to promote active aging, in its ninth additional disposition, calls
upon the Government to create an independent committee of experts, with the purpose of preparing a
report on the sustainability factor to be sent to the Toledo Pact Commission. After the presentation
by the Government of a preliminary report on the sustainability factor in the Social Security system,
the Council of Ministers of 12 April 2013 agreed to the creation of the committee of experts, whose
report was submitted on 7 June 2013.
The Committee of Experts Report, which was composed of twelve academics of recognized prestige,
proposes a sustainability factor of two components. The first is an Intergenerational Equity Factor
(IEF) designed to protect the system from an increase in life expectancy. According to this proposal,
the initial retirement pension is adjusted so that the amount received throughout the life of a pensioner
who has just entered the system is equivalent to that of another pensioner with identical characteristics
who entered the system earlier (and therefore, possibly with a lower life expectancy). Thus, the IEF
would be applied only to new pensioners to affect the determination of the initial amount of their
pension. As a correction would be applied to new pensioners if their life expectancy increases, this
would produce as a result an increase in the intergenerational equity of the system. The idea behind
the IEF is to compensate the longer life expectancy of the pensioners by lowering their initial pension.
This component was not completely novel in Europe because it was in line with Portugal’s Social
Security System reforms of 2010.
The second factor is the Annual Revaluation Factor (ARF). This factor affects the revaluation of all
pensions. It is calculated so that it ensures the budgetary equilibrium of the system. It would establish
a revaluation to be applied to the system’s existing pensioners so that revenues and expenditures are
in balance. Therefore, in accordance with the Committee of Experts’ proposal, the revaluation of the
pension is detached from the Consumer Price Index (CPI), contrary to how it had been calculated
before, and instead is based on the ARF. It is important to note that the proposed ARF, unlike the
IEF, lies outside the remit of the Law 27/2011 since it establishes a mechanism that is not directly
dependent on the evolution of life expectancy, but is linked to an economic factor – the economic
balance of the system.
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Based on the Committee of Experts Report, on 13 November 2013 the Government presented the draft
of the law regulating the sustainability factor and the revaluation index of the Social Security pension
system. In this draft, the sustainability factor is established from the concepts and ideas set out in the
IEF. The ARF is also adopted by way of the new figure of the revaluation index.
In contrast to the consensus reached in Law 27/2011, in this case there were discrepancies in the opinions
of the social agents that it affected. On 12 September 2013, the UGT trade union presented its analysis
and assessment of the Government’s proposal for the creation of the sustainability factor for the pension
system and the revaluation index. The report criticizes, among other things, the decrease in the initial
pension in real terms, and the non-discrimination between different life expectancies according to social
condition, work activity, or health of the future pensioners, as well as the subjectivity in applying the
calculation formula with the incorporation of estimates of the variables. On 24 September 2013, the
CCOO trade union presented its assessment of the draft. This criticized the proposed approach, based
on the containment of spending, and put forward a battery of alternative measures with which to act on
the pension system. Finally, on 26 September, the Spanish Economic and Social Council published its
opinion of the draft. In this, they raised doubts about a reform proposal made without the consensus
of the social agents involved after only a year having elapsed from the passage of Law 27/2011. It
considered it appropriate to study alternative ways of financing, and raised the possibility of including
in the automatic balancing mechanisms other variables that impact revenues such as those related to
economic activities, the evolution of employment, and work participation. Finally, they advise the
Government to reconsider the application of the new revaluation index since it fails to ensure the
maintenance of the purchasing power of the pensions.
Finally, on 26 December 2013 the Government passed Law 23/2013 regulating the Sustainability Factor
and the Revaluation Index of the Social Security Pension System, thereby modifying Articles 48 and
163 of the revised General Law on Social Security providing legislative recognition of the revaluation
index and the sustainability factor, respectively. Also, it establishes upper and lower bounds for the
revaluation of the pensions to ensure their nominal increase.
The present paper has the following structure. Section 2 describes the previous revaluation model and
the current pension reform. Section 3 analyses the mathematical aspects and formulas of the model,
highlighting the drawbacks with their formalization and implementation. In Sections 4 and 5, we shall
discuss some extensions of the basic model. Section 6 gives examples of its use with real data from the
Spanish Social Security System. Finally, Section 7 presents our conclusions.
2 The revaluation of Spanish pensions
As was mentioned in the previous section, one of the objectives of the reform provided in the Law
23/2013 is to rethink the revaluation model of the state pensions by means of a new modification of
Article 48 of the revised General Law on Social Security. In particular this would modify the pension
revaluation scheme in the Social Security system.
The legislative antecedents to the new reform established a direct link between the CPI and the reval-
uation of the pensions. Law 24/1972 of 21 June, regarding financing and perfecting the protective
actions of the General Regime of the Social Security, foresaw in its Article 5 a periodic revaluation of
the pensions by the government. This was proposed by the Labour Minister, taking into consideration
among other indicative factors the mean rise in wage levels, the cost of living index, and the general
evolution of the economy, as well as the economic possibilities of the Social Security system. This
procedure was also reflected in the revised General Law on Social Security of 20 June 1976 in its Article
92. Subsequently, Law 26/1985 of 31 July, on urgent measures for the rationalization of the structure
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and of the protective action of the Social Security, established in its Article 4 that pensions based on
the application of the modifications made to this law would be revalued at the beginning of each year
in accordance with the projected CPI for that year. These considerations were reflected in the law Real
Decreto-Ley 1/1994 of 20 June approving the revised General Law on Social Security, which includes
in its Article 48 the revaluation of the pensions because of retirement and disability in agreement with
the projected CPI for that year, while establishing the periodic revaluation by the Government of the
remaining pensions recognized by the Social Security system taking into account, among other indica-
tive factors, the mean rise in wage levels, the CPI, and the general evolution of the economy, as well
as the economic possibilities of the Social Security system. The deviations that may occur between the
inflation that was expected for the year and that which actually occurred are taken into consideration
the following year to improve all contributive pensions below the minimum inter-professional wage.
The pre-reform pension revaluation model, effective beginning with the passage of Law 24/1997 of 15
July on the consolidation and rationalization of the Social Security system, established an automatic
revaluation of the pensions in accordance to the annual variation of prices, thus ensuring the purchasing
power of the pensioners. The mechanism which determined the revaluation of the contributory pensions
(including the amount of the minimum pension) was as follows. First, at the beginning of each year,
the pensions were revalued in accordance with the projected CPI for that year. Second, if the CPI
accumulated between the previous November and the November of the financial year corresponding
to the revaluation was greater than projected, then the revaluation was adjusted by that difference.
This adjustment was paid in a single payment before 1 April of the subsequent year. In the case that
the CPI between the two Novembers was less than expected, the difference was to be absorbed in the
revaluation of the following financial year.
The automatic revaluation mechanism introduced in the Law 24/1997 was not, however, always applied.
This was due to the need to comply with certain fiscal objectives. For example, the revaluation of the
pensions corresponding to 2011 was suspended by the Law 39/2010 of 22 December of the General State
Budget. Although it was not applied to the Social Security’s minimum pensions, non-contributory
pensions, or the (now extinct) non-recurring Compulsory Elderly and Incapacity Insurance pensions,
the extraordinary suspension of the pensions marked a break in the guarantee to maintain their real
value. The suspension was necessary to achieve the reduction of the State deficit proposed in the law
Real Decreto-Ley 8/2010 of 22 May, which required measures to be taken to reduce State expenditure.
The estimated saving from freezing the pensions for that year is estimated to have been 1400 million
euros according to the Stability Programme 2011-2014.
Subsequently, for 2012, due to the large deficit in the Social Security system and the liquidity tensions at
the end of the year corresponding to the ordinary and extraordinary monthly payments, the revaluation
of the pensions was again not in agreement with the actual CPI. The law Real Decreto-Ley 28/2012 of
30 November on measures for the consolidation and guarantee of the Social Security system prepared
the rescinding of the updating of the pensions in 2012 in accordance with the actual CPI datum. Instead
it kept the revaluation of 1% foreseen in the law Real Decreto-Ley 20/2011 of 30 December on urgent
measures concerning budgetary, taxation, and financial matters to correct the State deficit. Also, a
revaluation of 1% was fixed for 2013, with the exception of pensions of less than 14 000 euros per year,
which were to be revalued by 2%.
To avoid distortions in the order of the pensions that could arise from the application of the percentages
established by the law Real Decreto-Ley 28/2012, the law Real Decreto-Ley 29/2012 of 28 December
dealing with improvement of social protection and management especially for domestic employees, and
other socio-economic measures, refines the previous law. It establishes that pensions between 1000.01
euros per month or 14 000.01 euros per year and 1009.90 euros per month or 14 138.60 euros per year
will be increased by the amount necessary for the resulting pension to reach the amount of 1020.00
euros per month or 14 280.00 euros per year.
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The new Law 23/2013 substantially modifies the mechanism for revaluing the pensions. The Social
Security pensions, in their contributory modality (including the amount of the minimum pension), will
be increased at the beginning of each year in accordance with the so-called index of revaluation. This
index will be published each year in the corresponding General State Budget Law. This new revaluation
mechanism is completely different from the previous ones as it unlinks the revaluation of the pensions
from the Consumer Price Index.
The computation of the index of revaluation (IR) for the pensions of the year t + 1 is articulated by
a mathematical expression which includes various components that affect the financial balance of the
system. The expression for the revaluation is:
IRt+1 = g¯I,t+1 − g¯p,t+1 − g¯s,t+1 + α
[
I∗t+1 −G∗t+1
G∗t+1
]
. (1)
The first term involved in the calculation is g¯I,t+1, the rate of variation in per unit terms of the Social
Security’s revenues. The bar over the variable reflects that for its calculation the arithmetic mean will
be used of eleven years centred on the year t + 1. For the calculation, the data from year t − 5 to
year t+ 6 are used, as it is necessary to have twelve observations to obtain eleven variation rates. The
second term (g¯p,t+1) is the variation in per unit terms of the number of contributory pensions to the
system. The third term is g¯s,t+1. This measures the substitution effect expressed in per unit terms.
The substitution effect is defined as the interannual variation of the mean pension in the system in
one year in the absence of the revaluation of that year. Analogously to the rate of variation of the
revenue, for the calculation of g¯p,t+1 and g¯s,t+1 the mean will be used of eleven variation rates centred
on t+ 1. Other elements to be considered are I∗t+1 and G∗t+1, the geometric means centred on t+ 1 of
the revenue and expenditures of the system, respectively. According to the legislation, revenue will be
taken to be the total of the system’s aggregate expenditure and revenue corresponding to non-financial
operations (chapters 1-7 in expenditure and 1-7 in revenue of the Social Security Budget) without
regard for those corresponding to the National Institute of Health Management and the Institute for
Older Persons and Social Services1. However, the part corresponding to revenue does not include the
social contributions due to the cessation of activity of self-employed workers or the State’s transfers
for the financing of non-contributory benefits, except for the financing of the complements to the
minimum pensions. The part corresponding to expenditure does not include the benefits paid for the
cessation of activity of self-employed workers or non-contributory benefits, except for the complements
to the minimum pensions. Also, regarding the liquidated accounts, the Social Security General Public
Accounts Department will deduct from the above chapters those items that have no periodic character.
Note that for the computation of the revenues and expenditures of the system, since the absolute
amounts are used rather than rates of variation, it is only necessary to use eleven observations, not
twelve.
Finally, the expression incorporates a parameter α which must take a value between 0.25 and 0.33, and
will be revised every five years. The function of this parameter is to regulate the speed at which the
system’s budgetary imbalance is corrected. If α were to take the extreme value of 0, the imbalance will
never be corrected, whereas if it were to take the extreme value of 1, the budgetary imbalance will be
corrected in one year, the year of application.
In order to ensure the annual increase of the pensions, the new Law 23/2013 establishes bounds to
their revaluation. The result obtained when applying Equation (1) can not result in an annual increase
1This definition of revenue and expenditure differs from the Draft’s proposal, which only included the items of current
operations (chapters 1 to 4 in expenditure and 1 to 5 in revenue). Thus, items would be excluded that relate to outlays
for real property investments and capital transfers, and to revenues from the disposal of real property investments and
capital transfers.
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of neither less than 0.25% nor greater than the percentage variation of the CPI in the one-year period
previous to the December of the year t plus 0.5%.
3 Basic considerations of the model
Having reviewed the recent legislative antecedents of the revaluation of the pensions of the Spanish
Social Security system, in this section we shall analyse the economic model used for the derivation
of the revaluation index. Despite the number of comments and reports that have emerged following
the adoption of the IR, such as those mentioned in Section 1, only a few studies have carried out an
in-depth analytical study of the model (see De las Heras et al. (2014) and AIReF (2014)).
The interest in and need for such an in-depth analysis of the technical aspects of the revaluation
model arise from discussions with academics and consultants about its applicability. These meetings
brought out evidence for the lack of transparency of certain aspects of the model, leading to mistakes
in interpretation and to a disparity of opinions on its validity. We believe that the cause of these
differing opinions lies in the omission of an important part of the model’s derivation and an absence
of any analysis in depth of its implications. The present study has the aim of filling in these gaps and
of rigorously analysing the implications of the approach chosen to obtain the IR. We believe that a
detailed study of the model will facilitate its better comprehension for subsequent further discussion.
From a strict reading of the Law 23/2013, it is difficult to acquire a correct understanding of the method
used to revalue the pensions, since it limits itself to setting out Equation (1). The cause is twofold.
On the one hand, the components of the expression are not defined mathematically, which can lead to
mistakes in its application. And on the other, neither is it shown what the balance of the system is that
is needed to derive the revaluation index. In the following sections, we shall break down the economic
model behind the IR expression step by step to assess its applicability and limitations.
3.1 Formalization of the variables
To clarify the deduction of Equation (1), one must take as starting point the Committee of Experts
Report on the sustainability factor of the state pension system. It reflects, among other aspects, the
pensions’ Annual Revaluation Factor (ARF) which was the origin of the IR that was finally set out
in the Law 23/2013. Underlying the ARF is the idea of distributing the system’s potential deficit or
surplus among the existing pensioners, i.e., among those who already formed part of the system the
year before. Thus the pensioners who have just joined the system are excluded from the benefits or
charges that are to be distributed.
In Annex A3.1 the Committee of Experts Report, the derivation of ARF starts with the definition of
the pension expenditure in the year t+ 1:
Gt+1 = Gt(1 + gt+1)(1 + gp,t+1)(1 + gs,t+1), (2)
where the factor (1+gt+1) reflects the variation of the amount of the existing or surviving pensions (i.e.,
those that were already in the system the previous year t), the factor (1 + gp,t+1) reflects the variation
of the number of pensions, and (1 + gs,t+1) (the substitution factor) reflects the variation of the mean
pension produced by the different values of the amounts of the pensions that leave the system and of
those which are newly incorporated in the year t+ 1. This expression decomposes the expenditure into
three multiplicative factors. However, the report does not detail the process by which this expression
is reached, and, similarly to the Law 23/2013, neither does it define any of the factors mathematically.
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This non-definition is a potential cause of misunderstandings and mistakes in its implementation. The
reasons are the following.
The first multiplicative factor in Equation (2) is (1 + gt+1). This factor reflects the nominal revaluation
that can be applied in the year t + 1 to all the pensions already in the system in the year t. As this
variable we shall consider to be unknown, no further formalization is needed. The formalization of the
second factor (1 + gp,t+1), relative to the rise in the number of pensions, does not seem to cause any
doubt either. If Nt represents the number of pensions in the year t, the factor (1 + gp,t+1) must be
equal to the ratio Nt+1/Nt. Thus one has
(1 + gp,t+1) =
Nt+1
Nt
. (3)
The formalization of the substitution factor (1 + gs,t+1) is more problematic based on its definition in
the report. It is worth noting that in the wording of the Law 23/2013 there is a redefinition of the
substitution effect, with it being defined as “the interannual variation of the system’s mean pension in
the absence of revaluation for that year”. This definition differs from that used in the Committee of
Experts Report. In any case, if one denotes the mean pension in the year t by P¯t, an equality coherent
with both definitions is:
P¯t+1/P¯t = (1 + gt+1)(1 + gs,t+1), (4)
from which one deduces
(1 + gs,t+1) =
P¯t+1/(1 + gt+1)
P¯t
. (5)
Thus the substitution effect would be obtained by discounting from the mean pension in the year t+ 1
the revaluation of the pensions, and then dividing it by the mean pension of the year before. At this
point it is important to note that the mean pension will be computed from all the pensions (also the
existing ones), and not only those to which the revaluation is being applied.
It is easy to verify that the definition of the factors (1 + gp,t+1) and (1 + gs,t+1) in the previously
described form is consistent with the decomposition of the expenditure described in Equation (2).
Since the expenditure of any year can be expressed as the product of the number of pensions by the
mean pension of that same year, one has Gt = NtP¯t, and therefore it will also have to be satisfied that
Gt+1
Gt
=
Nt+1P¯t+1
NtP¯t
. (6)
If one substitutes the expressions (3) and (4) into Equation (6), one recovers the expenditure formula
in the year t+ 1 reflected in (2).
An alternative way to reach the same decomposition of the expenditure of the year t+ 1 is as follows.
One knows that it is correct to multiply and divide simultaneously a variable by a non-negative variable
without modifying the result. Therefore, one can consider the decomposition
Gt+1 = Gt+1
Nt+1
Nt+1
Nt
Nt
P¯t+1
P¯t+1
P¯t
P¯t
(1 + gt+1)
(1 + gt+1)
,
that will be correct as long as Nt+1, Nt, P¯t+1, P¯t, and (1 + gt+1) are non-negative variables. Due to the
nature of the problem under study, it is reasonable to consider these variables to be strictly positive:
it would not be logical to consider the sustainability of the pension system if, for example, the number
of pensions or mean pension were null. It would be even less logical if the variables had negative
values. Thus, considering that Gt+1 = P¯t+1Nt+1, Gt = P¯tNt, and Equations (3) and (4), simplifying
one obtains the expression for the expenditure of the year t+ 1 in Equation (2).
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3.2 The basic model
The philosophy that underlies the basic model is to ensure a balanced budget. Therefore the expenditure
of the year t+ 1 must be equal to revenue in the same year t+ 1. If one expresses the revenues of the
year t+ 1 as It+1 = It(1 + gI,t+1), where the factor (1 + gI,t+1) denotes the variation of the revenue of
the year t + 1 with respect to the year t, following the steps of Annex 3 in the Committee of Experts
Report, one has
Gt(1 + gt+1)(1 + gp,t+1)(1 + gs,t+1) = It(1 + gI,t+1), (7)
so that
(1 + gt+1) =
(1 + gI,t+1)
(1 + gp,t+1)(1 + gs,t+1)
It
Gt
. (8)
Taking logarithms on both sides of the equation, and taking into account that g ≈ ln(1 + g) and that
ln (I/G)) ≈ (I −G)/G, one finally obtains
gt+1 = gI,t+1 − gp,t+1 − gs,t+1 +
(
It −Gt
Gt
)
, (9)
where gI,t+1 = (It+1 − It)/It, gp,t+1 = (Nt+1 −Nt)/Nt, and the substitution effect is defined as
gs,t+1 = (P¯t+1 − P¯t)/P¯t − gt+1. (10)
The goal of approximating Equation (8) is to obtain a simplified version of the result. For the exactness
of calculation, however, the result of Equation (8) will always be preferable to its approximation.
One way to interpret Equation (7) is to consider the expenditure of the year t + 1 as a three variable
function: the number of current pensions in t+ 1, the mean pension in t+ 1, and the revaluation of the
existing pensions in t+ 1. That is, if the goal is to modify the expenditure of the year t+ 1, there are
three paths to take. One is to modify the number of pensions in t+1. This option means tightening the
conditions to obtain a pension (e.g., delay the retirement age). A second option consists of modifying
the mean pension of the year t + 1. This option means, for example, altering the computation of the
base pension or the coefficients of reduction of the retirement pensions. Finally, there is the option of
varying the pensions’ revaluation. This is precisely the path the model considers to balance revenues
with expenditures.
Instead of considering as endogenous variables the number of pensions of the year t+ 1 and the mean
pension of t + 1, one can consider in their place the number of new pensions claimed in t + 1 and the
expenditure that these new pensions mean. This simplification would be made by adding two reasonable
hypotheses. On the one hand, one assumes that no legislative reform can affect the drop-outs from the
system. I.e., a tightening of the law cannot result in an increase in the number of drop-outs from the
system, by excluding the pension benefits which met the former but not the new requirements. On the
other hand, one also assumes that no legislative reform will affect the amounts of former pensions other
than by way of annual pension revaluations.
Just as the information for the year t+ 1 is included by way of endogenous variables, the information
for the year t is transmitted through exogenous variables. In particular, the information for the year t
is reflected by the variables P¯t and Nt. This information is considered to be exogenous since it is not
possible to modify it in order to alter the expenditure in year t+ 1.
From the above interpretation, equation Gt+1 = It+1 can be characterized as a contour It+1 of the
function of expenditure in t + 1. Thus, the three exogenous expenditure function variables can be
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modified while the constraint is met. The proposal of both the Committee of Experts Report and
the Law 23/2013 is to allow the variables Nt+1 and P¯t+1 to evolve so that the remaining variable, the
pension revaluation, is determined dependently to meet the budgetary target set in the contour curve.
Once budgetary balance has been expressed through Equation (7), one simply has to recast that ex-
pression to give the revaluation factor (1 + gt+1). Therefore, from the formula (9), it may appear that
the revaluation to apply to the existing pensions to balance the accounts is explicitly decomposed into
various elements. Quantifying each of these elements separately and adding (or subtracting) them, one
can calculate the revaluation to apply to the existing pensions corresponding to the year t+ 1.
However, the interpretation of the revaluation in this sense would not be correct. The definition of the
substitution effect (10) means that it is a function of the revaluation. Hence the revaluation can neither
be decomposed nor explicitly expressed in the elements of the expression (9). I.e., the calculation of the
revaluation requires the datum of the substitution effect and, in turn, the calculation of the substitution
effect requires the revaluation to have been calculated.
One solution to this problem is to calculate the revaluation and the substitution effect simultaneously.
Considering the implicit relationship
gt+1 − gI,t+1 + gp,t+1 + gs,t+1 −
(
It −Gt
Gt
)
= 0 (11)
one can evaluate the revaluation gt+1 numerically. Below, we shall show that this procedure is unneces-
sary since this basic model can be solved analytically. An analytical solution is more satisfactory, and
has major advantages over the numerical solution, both computationally and interpretatively.
We have detected the mistake of interpreting the revaluation as an explicit decomposition of various
elements among our professional colleagues. As noted above, it originates from the lack of formalization
of the elements involved in the expression (9), especially the substitution effect. From the above results,
it follows that the only correct way to calculate the substitution effect is by Equation (10). The use of
any other expression will lead to inaccuracies. This misinterpretation is not, however, easy to detect.
This is because, although the substitution effect may have been incorrectly calculated (without taking
into account that it depends on the revaluation), budgetary equilibrium will continue to be met, but
always at the cost of restricting either the new pension expenditure in year t + 1 or the number of
pensions in year t+ 1, or both together, two variables on which it is not intended to act.
The explanation is the following. Having estimated independently the substitution factor for the year
t+ 1, with result x, one would be adding a constraint to the model. Specifically, the constraint added
would be
(P¯t+1 − P¯t)/P¯t − gt+1 = x. (12)
To analyse the implications of the inclusion of this constraint, we first redefine components involved in
it in terms of the number of new pensions and the expenditure on them. This redefinition will also be
very useful in the following sections.
The mean pension in year t+1 is the ratio of the expenditures produced by all pensions in the year t+1
to the number of pensions in the same year. In addition, the mean pension in year t+1 incorporates both
the existing or surviving pensions and the new pensions. Let m be the number of surviving pensions
in the year t+ 1, i.e., the number of pensions already in the system in the year t and remaining in the
year t+ 1. Thus, the number of new pensions, i.e., the number of people entering the pension system
in the year t+ 1 is Nt+1−m. Let us denote by P it+1 the amount of the i-th pension in year t+ 1. Then
one has
P¯t+1 =
∑Nt+1
i=1 P
i
t+1
Nt+1
=
∑m
i=1 P
i
t+1 +
∑Nt+1
i=m+1 P
i
t+1
Nt+1
.
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The amount of the existing pensions in the year t+ 1, i.e., of those already in the system in the year t
and surviving in t+1, will be the same as in the previous year multiplied by the year t+1’s revaluation
factor, so that the above expression can be rewritten as
P¯t+1 =
∑m
i=1 P
i
t (1 + gt+1) +
∑Nt+1
i=m+1 P
i
t+1
Nt+1
.
In order to simplify notation, one can express the expenditure produced in the year t by the pensions
surviving from year t to year t+ 1 by Gst , and G
a
t+1 for the expenditure produced in the year t+ 1 by
the new pensions. Thus, the above expression will become
P¯t+1 =
Gst (1 + gt+1) +G
a
t+1
Nt+1
.
In turn, the number of pensions in t+1 can also be broken down into the number of pensions that have
survived from the year t to the year t+ 1 plus the number of pensions that have joined the system in
year t + 1. I.e., Nt+1 = N
s
t+1 + N
a
t+1. Taking these decompositions into account, the constraint (12)
can be rewritten as
Gst (1 + gt+1) +G
a
t+1
P¯t(N st+1 +N
a
t+1)
− (1 + gt+1) = x, (13)
which makes explicit the relationship between the three variables Nat+1, G
a
t+1, and gt+1.
Thus, calculating the revaluation by means of the expression
gt+1 = gI,t+1 − gp,t+1 − x+ It −Gt
Gt
,
one obtains a revaluation of pensions that would meet the budgetary balance condition. Implicitly,
however, it would be restricting the new pension expenditure in the year t + 1, or the number of
pensions in the year t+ 1, or both simultaneously.
For example, let us suppose that, with the number of pensions for the year t+ 1 estimated, we proceed
to calculate the variation in the number of pension properly but the substitution factor is estimated
incorrectly (i.e., differently from the result obtained by using Equation (10)) as x. Then, solving the
constraint (13) for Gat+1, one has that the expenditure produced by the new pensions would be restricted
to
Gat+1 = (x+ 1 + gt+1)P¯t(N
s
t+1 +N
a
t+1)−Gst (1 + gt+1).
On the contrary, the budgetary balance criterion would not be satisfied.
In summary, the above example illustrates the mistake committed by incorrectly interpreting the for-
mula (9) since there is only one consistent way to proceed to calculate the substitution effect, which
is to use Equation (10). Furthermore, the implicit basic model defined in the terms of Law 23/2013
requires the use of numerical methods to calculate the revaluation. In the next subsection, we shall
show how it is possible to more successfully perform the same calculation algebraically.
3.3 Alternative derivation of the basic model
Starting from the aforementioned problems, in this subsection we shall derive the revaluation factor
in an alternative form in the basic model to avoid those problems of formalization. The result of this
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new method of calculation is equivalent to that obtained by the formula (8). Its application is simpler,
however, since its solution does not require the use of numerical methods.
Recalling that expenditure in year t+1 may be decomposed into expenditure produced by the surviving
pensions and the expenditure produced by the new pensions, one has that
Gt+1 = G
s
t (1 + gt+1) +G
a
t+1. (14)
Now, in accordance with the philosophy of budgetary balance, expenditure in the year t+ 1 will have
to be equal to revenue in t+ 1, i.e.,
Gst (1 + gt+1) +G
a
t+1 = It+1.
The revaluation factor will thus be
(1 + gt+1) =
It+1 −Gat+1
Gst
. (15)
This proposal gives a more direct interpretation of formula (8). If the goal is to distribute the possible
surplus or deficit that the system might incur in the year t + 1 among the existing pensions, then it
is as simple as just subtracting from the expected revenue the expenditure associated with the new
pensions since this adjustment will not affect them, and then dividing the result among the expenditure
produced by the surviving pensions.
To the extent that the expenditure caused by the new pensions is small in proportion to the expenditure
produced by the surviving pensions, the revaluation factor may easily be approximated by
(1 + gt+1) ≈ It+1
Gt+1
.
This result is not inconsistent with the model proposed in the Committee of Experts Report. The
relationship between the two is as follows. From Equation (8), replacing the substitution factor by
expression (5), one obtains
(1 + gt+1) =
(1 + gI,t+1)
(1 + gp,t+1)
P¯t+1/(1+gt+1)
P¯t
It
Gt
.
Substituting P¯t+1 =
(
Gst (1 + gt+1) +G
a
t+1
)
/Nt+1 and P¯t = Gt/Nt in the above expression and simpli-
fying, one again obtains the expression for the revaluation factor (15).
Thus one has an alternative form of calculating in the basic model the revaluation factor of Spanish
pensions. Instead of having to calculate numerically as is necessary with Equation (8), the alternative
Equation (15) can provide an equivalent result analytically, and therefore accurately and with less
computational cost.
3.4 Extensions to the basic model
The formula for the pension revaluation contained in Law 23/2013 incorporates modifications to the
basic model described in this section. None of these extensions were considered as initial assumptions of
the model, but are instead added to the final expression. That is why each of these extensions requires
a detailed analysis.
Firstly, the Law 23/2013 sees as expenditures of the system the total expenditures for non-financial
transactions. This definition is inconsistent with the definition of expenditure in (2) since this latter
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only includes expenditure directly deriving from the amount of the pensions, as one deduces from the
definition of the substitution factor. To be consistent with the definition of Law 23/2013, Equation
(2) would have to refer to mean expenditure in non-financial transactions per pension instead of mean
pension. This discrepancy between mean pension and mean expenditure is crucial for the results.
Another alternative to correct this inconsistency would be to add to the definition of expenditures
those costs not directly deriving from the payment of the amount of the pensions. This alternative
would imply imputing to costs certain expenditures that function as fixed costs of the system. This
would have a leverage effect on the revaluation. In addition, the Law considers budgeted expenditures
(and revenues). These may differ from those finally settled, and thus not give a correct picture of the
actual situation of the system’s accounts.
Secondly, the model incorporates a parameter α which multiplies the last term of Equation (9). It
controls the speed at which the system’s imbalances are corrected. Throughout this section, and for
the sole purpose of simplicity, we have considered the particular case in which α = 1, so that any deficit
or surplus in the system is compensated in one year. In Section 4, we will relax this assumption to
carefully analyse the implications of the introduction of this parameter.
Thirdly, in the formula to apply in Law 23/2013, moving averages are considered for revenue and
expenditures. This last change has important implications from the point of view of application of the
model. It modifies considerably the technical aspects. Its analysis will be studied in Section 5.
And fourthly, there are set a lower bound of 0.25% and an upper bound of CPI + 0.5%. One notes
that this would lead to a contradiction for CPI values strictly less than -0.25%.
4 The parameter α
In a refinement of the model, the Committee of Experts Report introduces a coefficient α in the
expression for calculating the revaluation factor:
(1 + gt+1) =
(1 + gI,t+1)
(1 + gp,t+1)(1 + gs,t+1)
(
It
Gt
)α
.
The values of this parameter are in the range [0, 1]. The objective with it is to introduce the possibility
of regulating the speed of adjustment of the imbalance between revenues and expenditures. A value of
α close to 0 means that such adjustment will be slow and gradual. Instead, values close to 1 will mean
that a deficit will be significantly reduced in a small number of periods. In the extreme case with the
coefficient taking the value 1, the deficit would be canceled in the first period. Law 23/2013 fixes the
allowed range of variation of α to be between 0.25 and 0.33, and its value will be revised every five
years. The Law also sets the value at 0.25 for the first five years of implementation.
Because of the definition of substitution factor, the revaluation factor in the expression above must
be calculated numerically. Nevertheless, this problem can be dealt with by extending the simplified
model presented in the previous section to allow modulation of the speed at which the system’s deficit is
absorbed in a form that yields results algebraically. To take this possibility into account, the expenditure
in the year t has to be introduced, so that, from the alternative expression for the revaluation factor
(15) one obtains
(1 + gt+1) =
It+1 −Gat+1
Gst
Gt
Gt
. (16)
Grouping terms and given that It+1 = It(1 + gI,t+1), the addition of the parameter α means that
(1 + gt+1) = Gt
(1 + gI,t+1)
Gst
(
It
Gt
)α
− G
a
t+1
Gst
. (17)
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In this way, one can obtain the same result as in the extended model of the Expert Report, but
analytically.
The implications of introducing α as a parameter in the model are little detailed in the Committee of
Experts Report. The purpose of introducing this parameter is to permit the delay in the possible cuts
in the amount of the pensions, cuts which are associated with a negative value of the revaluation (or a
moderation of its positive value) during the first years after the reform.
It is important to note that the introduction of the parameter α directly into Equation (8) has the
effect of modifying the model’s equilibrium condition. This will no longer be equality between revenue
and expenditures, but be given by the equality(
It
Gt
)1−α
=
It+1
Gt+1
. (18)
From the definition of expenditures in the year t + 1 as Gt+1 = G
s
t (1 + gt+1) + G
a
t+1 and the above
equilibrium condition, it is easy to see that one obtains the expression (17) to calculate the revaluation
factor.
Therefore, an analysis of the revaluation factor shows that the coefficient α does not adjust the annual
imbalances, but instead is their cause. Also, one must keep in mind that any possible debt that might
exist at the time of implantation of the revaluation factor will never be absorbed by future revaluations.
The same would be the case with any possible deficits that might be generated which would not be
reabsorbed, and would accumulate in the form of a debt that can not be liquidated.
To demonstrate the above statements, let us compute the financial result generated by the model over
the course of years. Let Ht be the deficit (or surplus) generated by the system in the year t. From
Equation (18), it is easy to see that if in the initial period t = 0 the system is in equilibrium it remains
so for any future period t. If not, the deficit (or surplus) will be Ht = It −Gt, or, which is the same,
Ht = It−1(1 + gI,t)−
(
Gst−1(1 + gt) +G
a
t
)
.
Substituting the revaluation factor (17) in the above expression and simplifying, one has
Ht = It−1(1 + gI,t)−
(
Gt−1(1 + gI,t)
(
It−1
Gt−1
)α)
.
The above equality holds if It = It−1(1 + gI,t) and Gt =
(
Gt−1(1 + gI,t)
(
It−1
Gt−1
)α)
, simultaneously, so
that it must also be satisfied that
It
Gt
=
It−1
Gt−1
(
It−1
Gt−1
)α .
Simplifying, one obtains the difference equation ItGt =
(
It−1
Gt−1
)1−α
, precisely the same equilibrium equa-
tion of the model. Solving this equation, one finds that the expression for the ratio between revenue
and expenditure for any period t starting from initial revenue and expenditure I0, G0 is
It
Gt
=
(
I0
G0
)(1−α)t
. (19)
From this expression it is easy to see that if α ∈ (0, 1) then limt→∞ ItGt = 1, from which it follows that
revenues and expenditures tend to equalize in the long run, and therefore the system’s deficit will tend
to 0.
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Now, considering that It = I0
∏t
i=1(1 + gI,i) and Gt = It
(
G0
I0
)(1−α)t
, one can finally calculate the
financial result for any time t from the initial conditions of the system:
Ht = I0
t∏
i=1
(1 + gI,i)
(
1−
(
G0
I0
)(1−α)t)
.
There are two very important aspects to note in this result. Firstly, the deficit (or surplus) system does
not depend on expenditure on new pensions. It only depends on the initial state of the system, the
increases in revenues, and the choice of the parameter α. Secondly, the potential surplus or deficit of
the system depends on the sign of the term (1− (G0/I0))(1−α)
t
. When this term is positive, the system
will produce a surplus in its accounts. On the contrary, when it is negative, the system will generate a
deficit. Taking into account again that α ∈ (0, 1), one has that the financial result of the system will
depend for all t on its initial value, since if the ratio G0/I0 is less than unity (and therefore revenues
initially exceed expenditures), the value of Ht will always be positive. Similarly, if in the initial state
expenditures exceed revenue then the financial result will always be negative, so that the system will
incur deficits indefinitely. Therefore, it would be impossible for the Social Security Reserve Fund to
accumulate any possible surpluses because there would never be any.
Recall that the way the model is set out does not allow the system to absorb the accumulated debt.
So the only way to avoid a permanent deficit is to impose an upper bound on the revaluations. Then
financial surpluses would not impact in their full value on the surviving pensions, being instead capable
of covering potential shortfalls.
Regarding debt, its expression will depend on the sum of the financial results. Denoting by Dt the debt
in year t, one has for t = 1, 2, . . .
Dt = D0 +
t∑
j=1
I0
j∏
i=1
(1 + gI,i)
(
1− G0
I0
)(1−α)j
.
A positive value of debt will mean an excess of resources, while a negative value will mean that there
are outstanding accumulated deficits. Since we demonstrated above the convergence of the deficit and
its monotonic character with respect to the initial conditions, the debt will also be bounded. However,
as was commented on above, if there existed some initial debt, it will never be settled, but will increase
over time until reaching its upper bound.
An alternative to imposing an upper bound to the revaluation of existing pensions is to force a budgetary
equilibrium that includes the gradual absorption of the debt. For example, if the equilibrium equation
were of the form
It+1 +Dt
Gt+1
=
(
It +Dt−1
Gt
)1−α
,
since the results above prove that limt→∞
It+1+Dt
Gt+1
= 1, as the periods pass the revenue plus the debt
will converge to the expenditures. In this case, the revaluation factor would take the form
(1 + gt+1) =
It+1 +Dt
Gst
(
It +Dt−1
Gt
)α−1
− G
a
t+1
Gst
.
For the particular case of α = 1, all the debt is transferred to the existing pensions in a single period,
and is therefore settled in that one period.
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5 The moving averages
The most complex extension of the model presented by the Expert Committee is to consider moving
arithmetic and geometric means for the computation of the elements involved in determining the reval-
uation index. According to their Report, the aim of using means is to smooth out the impact of the
economic cycle. It recommends considering a window of eleven or thirteen years for the calculation.
Law 23/2013 finally fixed at eleven the number of years to use, centred on t+ 1, the year for which the
revaluation is calculated.
Perhaps the main criticism of the use of means is the need to estimate the expenditures and revenues
of the system for the future six years, i.e., from year t + 1 to year t + 6. According to Law 23/2013,
the Ministry of Economy and Finance shall provide the necessary forecasts of macroeconomic variables
needed for this estimation. That the Government itself will estimate these revenues and expenditures
raises doubts about the arbitrariness to which the calculation of the revaluation index may be subject.
With it being in the hands of the government to establish those projections, and therefore the values of
the means involved in the computation, the result of Equation (1) can be fixed arbitrarily. This point
is crucial, since one of the key advantages of implementing an automatic balancing mechanism is to
avoid, insofar as possible, government intervention.
In this section, we wish to reflect on other methodologically problematic issues which arise from the
introduction of moving averages to compute the revaluation index using Equation (1). In particular,
we shall discuss two major drawbacks. The first is that Equation (1) has no analytical solution. And
the second is that the model presents problems of dynamic consistency, so that there is no guarantee
that revenues and expenditures will compensate each other in either the short or the long terms.
To demonstrate the problem of the lack of an analytical solution, let us recall that pension expenditure
in year t + 1 is given by Gt+1 = G
s
t (1 + gt+1) + G
a
t+1. If one denotes by G
b
t the expenditure produced
by exits from the system, i.e., the expenditure produced by those pensions that do not survive to t+ 1,
then one has that Gt = G
s
t +G
b
t . Thus, substituting, one obtains
Gt+1 = (Gt −Gbt)(1 + gt+1) +Gat+1. (20)
In this way, one year’s expenditure can be related to the expenditure of the previous year. The
expenditure of period t+ 2 will then be
Gt+2 =
(
Gt+1 −Gbt+1
)
(1 + gt+2) +G
a
t+2
=
[((
Gt −Gbt
)
(1 + gt+1) +G
a
t+1
)
−Gbt+1
]
(1 + gt+2) +G
a
t+2
= Gst (1 + gt+1)(1 + gt+2) +
(
Gat+1 −Gbt+1
)
(1 + gt+2) +G
a
t+2.
Continuing with the process, one can obtain the expression of expenditure for the period t+ n:
Gt+n = G
s
t
n∏
i=1
(1 + gt+i) +
n−1∑
i=1
(
Gat+i −Gbt+i
) n∏
j=i+1
(1 + gt+j) +G
a
t+n. (21)
Note that the decision to modify the pension revaluation in year t+1 will explicitly affect the expenditure
in all future periods.
In Equation (1), the term G∗t+1 represents the geometric mean of expenditures centred on t + 1. This
requires the expenditure data from period t − 4 to period t + 7. The expenditure data for t − 3 to t
derive from historical data. In contrast, the expenditure data for t+ 1 to t+ 6 must be estimated. Here
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the problem lies in the computation of G∗t+1 =
∏10
i=0Gt+i−3. The product of these terms, defined above
in (21), will lead to a sum of terms in (1 + gt+1) raised to different powers, the largest of then being
the eleventh power. For this reason, since it will be impossible to isolate the factor (1 + gt+1) from the
term G∗t+1, Equation (1) will have no analytical solution. The revaluation may, however, be computed
numerically, as we shall show in the next section.
The second problem to consider with the use of moving averages is the model’s lack of dynamic con-
sistency. In calculating the revaluation index each year, one is choosing the index which satisfies the
corresponding condition of equilibrium. One of its components, the geometric moving average of ex-
penditures, includes both historical expenditures and future projections. To calculate the revaluation
index in period t+1 it is therefore necessary to make assumptions about the value of future revaluation
indices, in particular, for the period t+ 2. However, once the period t+ 1 has passed and one is prepar-
ing to calculate the revaluation factor for the following period t + 2, one will find that this does not
necessarily coincide with the value projected in the previous period to calculate the revaluation index
for t + 1. Hence, at t + 2, one will find that the equilibrium condition at t + 1 is no longer satisfied.
This process will be repeated time after time. This inconsistency would continue to hold even if the
forecast mean pension and numbers of new and of leaving pensions were fulfilled perfectly. As a result,
there will be no guarantee of the long-term convergence of the ratio of the mean values of expenditure
and revenue.
A possible alternative solution to this problem of dynamic inconsistency would be to calculate the
revaluation indices for all future periods simultaneously. This approach would, however, also entail
many difficulties. Given that the problem would have to be solved numerically, and that (as was shown
above) the revaluation index for each period would also have to be calculated numerically, this approach
would yield results with serious stability problems.
6 Numerical results
In this section, we shall present a numerical example of the applicability of the revaluation index of
Spanish pensions, illustrating results obtained in the foregoing sections. We shall take 2014 as the
reference year t. Hence, we will calculate the revaluation index for the year t+ 1 = 2015.
Taking Equation (1) into account, one needs data for the system’s revenue and expenditure for the 12
years from t−5 = 2009 to t+6 = 2020. In the case of the geometric mean of revenues and expenditures,
it will be sufficient to employ data from the period 2010-2020. To calculate the arithmetic means of the
rates of change of revenue, number of pensions, and substitution effect, we will use data for the period
2009-2020 (i.e., to calculate the mean variation of eleven periods, twelve years’ data are needed).
Since it is impossible to obtain from publicly available information the revenue and expenditure amounts
for 2009-2013 as defined in Law 23/2013, we will take the data used in AIReF (2014) provided by the
Ministry of Employment and Social Security. We took the values of the number of pensions and of the
mean pension from the Statistical Report published by the National Institute of Social Security for the
respective years.
For practical purposes, except for the value of IRt, the information for the year t is unavailable at the
time of calculating the revaluation index for the year t + 1. The data will there have to be estimated
from the information available as was done for the values corresponding to the period 2014-2020. Since
the purpose of this section is not calculate with precision the revaluation index for 2015, but simply to
illustrate some of the issues that have been discussed in the preceding sections, we shall make simple
assumptions for the estimates (for an in-depth methodological discussion of the revenue and expenditure
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forecasts, see AIReF (2014)).
In the case of revenues, from the AIReF (2014) data we shall assume that the annual variation is
4.092%. For the estimation of the expenditures, the Committee of Experts Report, Annex A3.2,
proposes calculating the expenditure for the year t+ 1 by the expression
Gt+1 = Nt+1P¯t+1
with P¯t+1 = P¯t(1 + gt)(1 + gs,t). I.e., the mean pension of year t + 1 would increase in accordance
with the revaluation of the pensions and the substitution effect of year t. We found this proposal to
be unsatisfactory for two reasons. Firstly, the results of Section 3 show that this expression does not
model a direct link between the expenditure of year t + 1 and pension revaluations. Correct in this
sense would be to use Equation (20) for the expenditure. Secondly, the proposal presents the problem
of describing an expenditure that is only affected by the number of pensions and the mean pension.
However, the amount of Social Security expenditure is greater than the product of these two factors. It
includes many other concepts, as can be seen in the data of Table 1 which details the difference between
mean budgeted expenditure and mean pension (considering fourteen monthly payments) as well as the
percentage difference between the two for the years 2009-2013.
Year Num. pensions Mean pension Mean expenditure % difference
2009 8 614 876 760.68 902.10 18.59%
2010 8 749 054 786.51 927.82 17.97%
2011 8 871 435 811.46 937.32 15.51%
2012 9 008 348 837.02 943.81 12.76%
2013 9 154 617 862.74 962.35 11.55%
Table 1: Percentage difference between mean expenditure and mean pension, 2009-2013.
As one sees, the differences, although diminishing, remain significant.
One can resolve the problems caused by the incorrect definition of expenditure by modifying Equation
(20) to incorporate costs that do not derive from the amount of the pensions. Let GFt be the system’s
expenditure generated for reasons other than payment of the amount of pensions in the year t. Then,
Gt+1 = (Gt −Gbt)(1 + gt+1) +Gat+1 +GFt+1. (22)
Taking as referents the data in Table 1, let us assume for simplicity that the expenditures not directly
deriving from the payment of pensions for the years 2014-2020 stay constant in absolute value and
equal to that of year 2013. This approach considers the expenditures GFt+1 to be fixed costs of the
system, so that the pension revaluations will not affect their amount. The drawback of this approach
is the leverage effect on the revaluation.
With respect to the expenditure caused directly by the payment of pensions, this also depends on the
numbers of new entries into and of exits from the system, and the amount of their mean pensions.
We extrapolated the annual mean of the last five years’ data of the 2013 Statistical Report of the
National Social Security Institute to the period 2014-2020. The annual percentage variations were: in
the number of newly entering pensions 6.12%, in that of exiting pensions 4.60%, in the mean pension
of the newly entering pensions 3.66%, and in the mean pension of the exiting pensions 4.14%.
Another set of data required was the revaluation of the pensions for the years 2009-2014. These values
are listed in Table 2. Note that, for the 2013 pension revaluation, the law Real Decreto-Ley 29/2012
establishes a different type of revaluation which depends on the amount of the pension. Although the
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datum for the exact percentage of the overall revaluation is not available, we estimated it to be 1.55%
from the distribution of pensions by intervals of amount from the Statistical Report of the National
Social Security Institute for the year 2012.
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Revaluation 2.0% 2.3% 0.00% 1.00% 1.55% 0.25%
Table 2: Percentage revaluation of Spain’s pensions for the years 2009− 2014.
Once the data had been acquired, we proceeded to calculate the revaluation index for 2015. Recall
that the first component of Equation (1) is g¯I,2015, i.e., the arithmetic mean centred on t+ 1 = 2015 of
the eleven values of the fractional (i.e., not percentage) rate of change of the Social Security system’s
revenue. The second component, g¯p,2015, is the arithmetic mean centred on t+ 1 = 2015 of the eleven
values of the fractional rate of change of the number of contributory pensions in the Social Security
system. The third component of the formula is g¯s,2015, the arithmetic mean centred on t+ 1 = 2015 of
eleven substitution effect values expressed as fractions. As detailed in Section 3, we shall use Equation
(10) for each year from t − 4 = 2010 to t + 6 = 2020. For each of these years, one needs to know the
corresponding revaluation index. Here we make the assumption that the revaluation index for the years
that need to be estimated is constant and equal to that of the year t + 1 = 2015, provided that this
value lies within the upper and lower bounds. Since one needs the revaluation index for the year 2015
in particular, and this datum is unknown since it is precisely what one intends to calculate, we shall
consider the implicit expression
g2015 − g¯I,2015 + g¯p,2015 + g¯s,2015 − α
(
I∗2015 −G∗2015
G∗2015
)
= 0 (23)
to calculate numerically the 2015 revaluation index, the substitution effects, and the expenditure for
each year, which also depends explicitly on its corresponding revaluation index through Equation (22).
The last component consists of three elements: the parameter α, and the geometric means centred
on t + 1 = 2015 of the eleven values of the amounts of the revenues and of the expenditures of the
system, denoted by I∗2015 and G∗2015, respectively. We use 0.25 for the value of the parameter α, as is
required by Law 23/2013 for the first five years of implementation. The values of I∗2015 and G∗2015 are
straightforward to calculate from the acquired and the estimated data. Note, however, that the results
of previous sections have shown that it would have been more consistent to centre the means on the
period t, and not on t+ 1 as is required by the Law.
With this information, the revaluation to apply to all the pensions in the year 2015 can be calculated
numerically. The result is g2015 = −1.73%. In this calculation, we ignored the lower bound of 0.25% for
the revaluation at t+ 1 as is established legally. The reason was that this would have given a distorted
view of the real result, and because in general applying Equation (23) for each year might not have a
solution.
Table 3 lists the results of the calculations of the system’s revenues, expenditures, number of pensions,
and mean pension. The revenue and expenditure values are in millions of euros.
From the above results, one can disaggregate the revaluation index value into its components: gI,2014 =
2.30%, g¯p,2014 = 1.52%, gs,2014 = 1.79%, I
∗
2015 = 126 216.38, and G
∗
2014 = 129 938.37, with these last
two values being in millions of euros.
20
Year Revenue Expenditure Pensions Mean pension
t-5 2009 117 397.00 108 800.30 8 614 876 760.68
t-4 2010 116 458.20 113 646.10 8 749 054 786.51
t-3 2011 116 119.00 116 415.80 8 871 435 811.46
t-2 2012 113 081.30 119 029.80 9 008 348 837.02
t-1 2013 113 505.10 123 339.50 9 154 617 862.74
t 2014 118 149.73 127 001.07 9 293 576 877.98
t+1 2015 122 984.42 128 671.77 9 434 645 877.50
t+2 2016 128 016.94 132 658.82 9 577 855 894.12
t+3 2017 133 255.39 136 822.07 9 723 238 911.33
t+4 2018 138 708.20 141 169.10 9 870 829 929.16
t+5 2019 144 384.14 145 707.80 10 020 659 947.62
t+6 2020 150 292.34 150 446.36 10 172 764 966.72
Table 3: Statistical data for the years 2009-2020.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analysed the technical aspects of the computation of the revaluation index of
Spain’s pensions. Based on a simplified model, we analysed step by step the elements that comprise
it, starting with the correct definition of the factors involved in its calculation. We then examined the
implications of adding directly the coefficient α to the final expression in order to regulate the rate at
which the deficit is reduced, and of the use of moving averages to calculate the magnitudes involved. The
results allowed us to show how, due to the convergence of revenue and expenditure, the introduction of
the parameter α into the final expression does not significantly condition the model. The introduction
of the moving averages into the final expression, however, does have a strong impact because it prevents
the revaluation index being computed analytically and no longer ensures the dynamic consistency of
the model. Finally, we analysed how redefining the expenditure variable leads to severe inconsistency
in the model, as was illustrated in a numerical example.
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